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ABSTRACT
In a local network or the Internet in general, data that is transmitted between 
two computers (also known as network traffic or simply, traffic) in that network is 
usually classified as being of a malicious or of a benign nature by a traffic authenti­
cation system employing databases of previously observed malicious or benign traffic 
signatures, i.e., blacklists or whitelists, respectively. These lists typically consist of 
either the destinations (i.e., IP addresses or domain names) to which traffic is being 
sent or the statistical properties of the traffic, e.g., packet size, rate of connection 
establishment, etc. The drawback with the list-based approach is its inability to of­
fer a fully comprehensive solution since the population of the list is likely to go on 
indefinitely. This implies that at any given time, there is a likelihood of some traffic 
signatures not being present in the list, leading to false classification of traffic.
From a security standpoint, whitelists are a safer bet than blacklists since their 
underlying philosophy is to block anything that is unknown hence in the worst case, 
are likely to result in high false rejects with no false accepts. On the other hand, 
blacklists block only what is known and therefore are likely to result in high false 
accepts since unknown malicious traffic will be accepted, e.g., in the case of zero-day 
attacks (i.e., new attacks whose signatures have not yet been analyzed by the security 
community).
Despite this knowledge, the most commonly used traffic authentication solu­
tions, e.g., antivirus or antimalware solutions, have predominantly employed blacklists 
rather than whitelists in their solutions. This can perhaps be attributed to the fact 
that the population of a blacklist typically requires less user involvement than that of 
a whitelist. For instance, malicious traffic signatures (i.e., behavior or destinations) 
are usually the same across a population of users; hence, by observing malicious ac­
tivity from a few users, a global blacklist that is applicable to all users can be created. 
Whitelist generation, on the other hand, tends to be more user-specific as what may 
be considered acceptable or benign traffic to one user may not be considered the same 
to a different user. As a result, users are likely to find whitelist-based solutions that 
require their participation to be both cumbersome and inconveniencing.
This dissertation offers a whitelist-based traffic authentication solution that 
reduces the active participation of users in whitelist population. By relying on activity 
that users regularly engage in while interacting with their computers (i.e., typing), 
we are able to identify legitimate destinations to which users direct their traffic and 
use these to populate the whitelist, without requiring the users to deviate from their 
normal behavior. Our solution requires users to type the destinations of their outgoing 
traffic requests only once, after which any subsequent requests to that destination are 
authenticated without the need for them to be typed again.
Empirical results from testing our solution in a real time traffic analysis sce­
nario showed that relatively low false reject rates for legitimate traffic with no false 
accepts for illegitimate traffic are achievable. Additionally, an investigation into the 
level of inconvenience that the typing requirement imposes on the users revealed that,
since users are likely to engage in this (typing) activity during the course of utilizing 
their computer’s resources, this requirement did not pose a significant deterrent to 
them from using the system.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Background
Authentication plays a vital role in securing a system from potential intruders 
as it provides an avenue to guarantee the privacy and confidentiality of resources 
on the system. Recently, the term active (continuous) authentication [8] has been 
contrived in reference to the act of periodically authenticating the users of a system to 
ensure that no unauthorized users gain access to the system at any point. Although 
the use of this term is fairly recent in the authentication community, the underlying 
principle of continuous system monitoring has been in existence for some time in other 
authentication areas such as in real time network traffic monitoring and/or analysis. 
In this dissertation, we explore continuous authentication from the perspective of 
ensuring the data that is continually being transmitted from one computer to another, 
either in a local network or globally on the Internet, is authenticated. In the rest of 
this dissertation, we loosely refer to this data as (network) traffic.
In traffic-based continuous authentication, many systems have taken the ap­
proach of creating impostor (malicious traffic) templates based off of which to compare 
unknown traffic during classification. The disadvantage with this approach, though, 
is that the creation of a complete template is infeasible since the set of potentially
1
2malicious traffic is indefinite, thereby resulting in a significant number of malicious 
traffic going undetected. Although the use of templates that are built based on benign 
traffic eliminates this problem, this has not been fully explored in many solutions 
because it usually involves a significant effort on the part of users in the template 
building process, a scenario that is deemed undesirable to a user.
This dissertation proposes a benign traffic-based template generation approach 
that minimizes user participation in the template building process. The template used 
in our solution comprises the destinations to which users send traffic. The template is 
updated with new destinations after they have been authenticated by a user through 
typing. This signifies that those destinations are associated with benign traffic. In 
the authentication process, each destination to be authenticated, is accompanied by 
an authentication code whose integrity, in the face of possibly malicious traffic, is 
guaranteed using a recently proposed concept of dual channel approaches that are 
used for message authentication when one of the channels is assumed to be insecure.
In these dual channel protocols, information transmitted through one channel 
is authenticated using information transmitted over the other channel. The moti­
vation behind the use of dual channel authentication protocols is the assumption 
that in a properly designed dual channel protocol, impostors cannot authenticate 
themselves if, (i) just one of the channels is compromised, or (ii) both channels are 
compromised but attacks on them are not coordinated. Existing literature details two 
families of dual channel protocols, namely: non-interactive (e.g., [2, 16, 34, 27, 36]) 
and interactive (e.g., [37, 43, 28]) protocols.
The concept of using duality-based solutions to strengthen authentication 
systems is not unique to dual channel protocols. For instance, it has been previously 
explored in, among others, dual factor based authentication [1, 47, 7] and dual server 
based password management [5, 48, 24, 23]. The former propose the use of two 
factors in the authentication process. These factors can be chosen from something 
that the user knows e.g., a password, something that the user has e.g., a smart card, 
or something that the user is e.g., a biometric signature. This idea was proposed with 
the view that since impostors cannot easily gain access to both authentication factors, 
they (impostors) cannot be falsely authenticated as a genuine user.
The latter, on the other hand, consider scenarios where the server side compro­
mises are likely to occur. Generally in these solutions, the user (client) has access to 
and communicates with only one of the servers through a secure channel that can be 
realized via Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) [5]. Taking the example of a password-based 
authentication scheme, these solutions propose the splitting of a user’s password into 
two parts with each server keeping one of the parts. During authentication, the 
user is independently verified by both servers which communicate via a protected 
channel [48]. These solutions also provide for server integrity verification which is 
done through a series of cryptographic challenges that are sent back and forth between 
the client and server during the authentication process.
1.2 Research Focus
One of the primary threats of malware infection is the leakage of information 
from a compromised computer to an external malicious entity cooperating with the
4malware without the user’s knowledge or permission. We refer to this problem as 
“information exfiltration”. This scenario can be visualized for instance when a bot 
program is installed on a target computer and upon installation, the program accesses 
specific information (e.g., account passwords, credit card information) which it then 
remits to a predetermined destination such as the bot’s command and control server.
Bearing this scenario in mind, the work in this dissertation aims to avert this 
type of information exfiltration by authenticating the outgoing traffic from a user's 
computer. By visualizing the user’s computer as one entity and a proxy, through 
which traffic is filtered before it is sent to (and received from) the Internet, as 
another entity, we design a non-interactive dual channel protocol for authenticating 
the outgoing traffic. The choice of non-inter active over interactive protocols is made 
largely with the aim of minimizing additional overhead costs in terms of back and 
forth communication between entities during authentication, which implies that the 
protocol operation costs are reduced.
In literature, the non-interactive family of dual channel protocols, e.g., [16, 
34, 2, 27, 36, 33, 40, 26] use a narrow-band authenticated channel and a wide-band 
insecure channel for communication. A remote verifier authenticates the informa­
tion received through the wide-band insecure channel using a piece of brief infor­
mation received through the narrow-band authenticated channel that an adversary 
has no (or limited, for some protocol) control over. These protocols are called non­
interactive since, by design, information flow in them is unidirectional, which keeps 
them lightweight.
5However, the existing non-interactive dual channel protocols are only ideal 
for applications that do not require frequent transmission of information over the 
authenticated channel because the authenticated channel in these protocols is pre­
sumed to be human aided, implying that users are required to be explicitly engaged 
in each authentication event. An application example is the authentication of a 
computer to a wireless printer by entering the computer’s identification code to the 
printer, manually. If the manual authenticated channel is replaced by a non-manual 
authenticated channel, then remotely located verifiers become prone to a channel 
spoof attack, as explained in Chapter 2, defeating the protocols’ purpose.
In contrast, the solution presented in this dissertation infers implicit current 
or prior approval of a destination from the users before authenticating the traffic sent 
from the host computer to that destination. The underlying protocol ensures that 
such inference is not corrupted by the malware residing in the host computer. It 
authenticates each outbound user-request by analyzing the keys (not the keystroke 
timings) a user types during the normal course of computer usage.
Our solution uses two communication channels, an insecure one which connects 
to a host computer and an authenticated one that bypasses the host, and connects to 
a remote verifier. A string processor sits between these channels and the keyboard. 
It controls the flow of keys from the keyboard to the channels, but it does not accept 
any incoming data or execution requests other than the signals necessary for the basic 
operation of the keyboard. We assume that the keyboard and string processor are 
not pre-compromised during manufacturing or in the supply chain.
6The solution is non-interactive because it does not require the user to respond 
to any verifier-request for the authentication to take place. However, it requires that 
the user types a destination IP/domain name for the first time a traffic request is sent 
to that destination. This can affect user convenience, for instance, if all the external 
links in a Web page need to be typed. A possible tradeoff between security and user 
convenience, in this case, can be achieved by letting such links received in response 
to an authenticated request be considered as legitimate for a temporary period. We 
propose a protocol extension for this that can be integrated with the core dual channel 
non-interactive protocol executed in the verification server. We also propose another 
protocol extension to handle scenarios where exfiltration is done via external third 
party legitimate servers (e.g. Webmail servers). However, implementation of this 
extension requires the participation of the associated third party legitimate servers 
and hence is not covered in this dissertation.
The proposed protocol does require an auxiliary manual channel for synchro­
nizing certain operations between the communication parties. This is, however, a one- 
step process required during the initial setup. Subsequent continuous authentication 
does not require this manual channel’s involvement.
1.3 Contributions of this Dissertation
The contributions of this dissertation are outlined below:
1. We introduce the first non-interactive dual channel protocol for traffic authen­
tication purposes. This protocol is designed to be resistant to channel spoof
7attacks that existing non-interactive dual channel protocols suffer from when 
applied to continuous authentication scenarios.
2. Through a prototype deployment of the protocol, we empirically demonstrate 
its effectiveness in preventing information exfiltration. Specifically, we show 
that the protocol is able to achieve, for legitimate requests, a daily average true 
accept rate of 99.5% and a maximum false reject rate of 6%, while maintaining 
a 0% false accept rate for illegitimate requests.
3. Unlike existing protocols that typically base the security of the authenticated 
channel on the fact that it is human-aided, we introduce the concept of using 
secure, external hardware modules to realize the security of the authenticated 
channel. This is also in contrast to the use of internal hardware modules such 
as Trusted Platform Modules (TPMs) that have been relied upon in other 
security-related schemes, since their security benefits cannot be realized in our 
application context.
1.4 Definitions
For purposes of clarity to the reader, we provide some definitions of terms used 
in this dissertation and the context in which they are used.
Information exfiltration: This refers to the leakage of information, by malware 
residing on a possibly compromised computer, to an external entity cooperating with 
the malware.
Destination: This refers to either the domain name or Internet Protocol (IP) address 
to which a Web request is being sent.
8Typed requests: These refer to Web requests that are sent after their destinations 
have been typed by the user.
Non-typed requests: These refer to Web requests that are sent with no typing 
activity involved, e.g., requests sent after their destinations have been copied and 
pasted (e.g., from a document into the browser), selected from a drop-down list, auto­
completed by the Web browser, etc.
Legitimate requests: These refer to Web requests that are sanctioned by the user. 
They consist of both typed and non-typed requests.
Illegitimate requests: These refer to Web requests that are not sanctioned by the 
user and are presumed to be sent by a malicious entity on the user’s computer.
(a1, b') is consistent: In a two-party communication, when two pieces of information 
are received by the message recipient, (o', b') is consistent if the b that is independently 
computed by the recipient (using the received a') is the ^ame as the received b'. 
Embedded links: These refer to destinations that are contained (embedded) in 
responses to legitimate outgoing Web requests, e.g., links on a returned Web page. 
Enforced user response: This refers to a scenario where a user is compelled to 
type a destination of a previously rejected outgoing Web request.
1.5 Organization of this Dissertation
In Chapter 2, we present a review of the existing dual channel protocols (both 
the interactive and non-interactive ones), as well as the current traffic authentication 
schemes that relate to the work in this dissertation. We then introduce our protocol 
in Chapter 3 and present a prototype implementation of it in Chapter 4. In Chapter
95, we provide discussions on some aspects of the protocol’s implementation such as an 
alternate placement design of the protocol’s second channel, and how optimization of 
the verifier’s workload can be achieved. Finally, we present concluding remarks and 
possible directions for future work in Chapter 6.
CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1 Dual Channel-based Solutions
The notion of using dual channel protocols arose out of a need to provide 
secure communication over insecure channels. This is especially desirable in ad hoc 
networks where Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) is non existent and/or undesirable. 
The general idea behind these protocols is the transmission of a short authentication 
bit (or string) over a narrow band authenticated channel in order to authenticate the 
message transmitted over the wide band insecure channel.
In literature, these protocols are categorized as being either interactive or 
non interactive, depending on whether the communication between the sender and 
recipient of information is one-way or two-way. We review some of the existing 
protocols below.
2.1.1 Interactive Protocols
Rivest and Shamir [37] are believed to have introduced the first interactive pro­
tocol in which they proposed using human voices in the authentication process when 
two parties wish to establish a secure key that is to be used in future communication 
instances. The idea behind their protocol was that the two communicating parties 
are able to identify each other’s voice; hence, an eavesdropper cannot impersonate
10
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any of the parties without being discovered. This protocol is also credited for hav­
ing introduced the idea of human assistance in the realization of the authenticated 
channel, a common scenario in dual channel protocols.
In general, subsequently proposed protocols have mainly differed in terms of 
the security tokens used and adversarial models considered. For instance, Vaudenay 
[43] proposed using extractable commitment schemes to secure the information sent in 
their protocol and considered the chosen random string adversarial model. Mashatan 
and Stinson [28], on the other hand, proposed utilizing Interactive Collision Resistant 
(ICR) hash functions in their protocol, considered the adaptive chosen plain-text 
attack model, and also allowed adversaries to have online computational power, a 
scenario that Vaudenay’s protocol [43] did not address.
Example applications of these protocols. As mentioned above, the 
interactive family of dual channel protocols uses the bi-directional flow of information 
between communicating parties over two channels [49, 1, 44, 22, 11]. In some authen­
tication systems, the second channel is used to transmit additional authentication 
factors that are required before authentication can be granted. For instance, in
a bid to improve security on many online systems today, it has become common
t
practice to use more than just a user password or Personal Identification Number 
(PIN) as an authentication factor when granting access to the system. Some of the 
additional factors typically used to authenticate users on these systems include either 
a user's biometric signature (e.g., fingerprint, keystroke, iris) or something in the 
user’s possession e.g., a secure token or mobile device that can be used to identify the 
said user as a legitimate user of the system.
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For example, Yang et a/.’s [47] work focussed on boosting the use of smart 
cards as a second factor in user authentication. In their work, they proposed new 
security requirements to improve existing smart card-based two factor authentication 
schemes. Among their proposed requirements is the ability for users to change pass­
words without involving the authenticating server and the elimination of a password 
database at the server side.
The choice of additional authentication factors for most systems usually boils 
down to the cost associated with implementing the chosen authentication factor. 
For instance, Aloul et al. [1] proposed using mobile phones to generate One Time 
Passwords (OTPs) that the user can enter into an online system in addition to his or 
her password or PIN. In their approach, the OTP can be generated either locally on 
the mobile phone or by requesting it, via SMS message, from a remote server. Their 
choice of mobile phones is driven by their availability to most users, hence reducing 
the implementation cost associated with their deployment.
Another practical example using mobile phones is Google’s 2-step verification 
that uses the text or voice channel in a phone to respond to an authentication request 
received over the Internet channel [17]. Upon receiving an authentication request from 
a host machine over an Internet channel, Google’s remote server sends back a PIN to 
the associated user’s phone that the user (reads or listens to and) sends back to the 
server using the Internet channel. The server authenticates the user upon receiving 
the exact PIN that it sent.
In other works [44, 33, 40, 26, 22], mobile devices have been used to send private 
information securely through untrusted terminals. In these studies, the trusted mobile
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devices establish connection to the terminals and send encrypted information through 
the terminals to remote servers, or wirelessly bypass the terminals and send this 
information directly to the remote servers. In one variation of these protocols [11], 
the authenticating Web server sends back a cryptographic challenge in the form of 
a two-dimensional picture to the browser and the user takes a picture of that image 
using a mobile phone. The user then sends a cryptographic response via wireless to 
the server. In another variation [22], a trusted proxy intercepts the login requests 
from untrusted machines to Web servers and asks the users, through their trusted 
mobile devices, to authenticate those requests before they are sent out; the proxy also 
removes any information from the responses that the users might not want to reveal 
to the untrusted machines.
Garriss et al. [15] and Dodson et al. [11] used a mobile device to determine 
the level of trust a user should place on the terminal before using its resources. In 
their work, the terminals were assumed to possess hardware security technologies 
such as a Trusted Platform Module (TPM) [18] that can be used to determine 
the trustworthiness of software on the terminal. The mobile device established a 
connection with the terminal, requested for an attestation of the terminal’s software 
and recommended to the user whether or not the terminal could be trusted.
The common thread among all these works is the requirement for users’ in­
volvement in every authentication request, hence rendering them unsuitable for ap­
plications requiring frequent authentication.
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2.1.2 Non-interactive Protocols
In contrast to the interactive protocols, the non-interactive protocols are de­
signed for only unidirectional flow of information, which keeps them lightweight. This 
makes them a more desirable option for message authentication because of the reduced 
operational cost of the protocol. Interactive protocols are therefore usually chosen 
over the non-interactive ones in cases where they (the interactive protocols) increase 
the security of the protocol such as when replay attacks on the authenticated channel 
are considered -  a scenario which non-interactive protocols are vulnerable to [28].
Below, we provide only a brief review of the existing non-interactive protocols. 
A tabular comparison of them, based on shared properties (e.g., security features 
used, assumed security of manual channel, etc.), is also given in Appendix B. For 
detailed descriptions of the protocols, we refer the reader to the respective cited works. 
In the accompanying protocol figures, a is added to information received by Bob 
(indicating that the information sent by Alice may or may not be the same as the 
information that is received by Bob). The insecure and authenticated channels are 
represented using and “=£•” , respectively.
Balfanz et al. (BSSW’02 in Figure 2.1) [2] proposed the first such protocol 
in which a message M  and its hash h are sent over the insecure and authenticated 
channels, respectively. In their protocol, they compute h from M  using a collision 
resistant hash function. However, their protocol was seen to be vulnerable to offline 
attacks (e.g., the birthday attack).
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BSSW'02
Alice M Bob
M -------------> M'
h
h=H(M) 1 .... h'
If h'=H(M')
Accept M'
Else
Reject M'
Figure 2.1: Balfanz et a i’s protocol.
To address this vulnerability, Gehrmann et al. (GMN’04 in Figure 2.2) [16] 
proposed the MANA 1 protocol. In the MANA 1 protocol, the hash of a message is 
computed by applying a random key to a universal hash function. The hash and the 
key are then sent over the authenticated channel and the message is sent over the 
insecure channel. This protocol assumes confidentiality of the authenticated channel. 
Further improvements to the MANA 1 protocol, that make different assumptions over 
the authenticated channel, have also been proposed in [30, 31].
GMN'04
Alice M Bob
M -------------> M'
Choose K h,K
h=Hi<(M) h 'X
If h’=H4M')
Accept M'
Else
Reject M ’
Figure 2.2: Gehrmann et al.’s protocol.
Pasini and Vaudenay’s protocol (PV’06 in Figure 2.3) [34] assumed an au­
thenticated channel in which an adversary is only restricted from modifying the 
messages. The security of their protocol is guaranteed by using trapdoor commitment
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schemes and second preimage resistant hash functions. A commitment is applied to 
the message and a key to produce commit “c” and decommit “cf values. The hash of 
“c” is transmitted through the authenticated channel and “c” and “d” are sent over 
the insecure channel.
PV'06
Alice c\\d Bob
(c,d)*-commit(K,M) -------------> M'<-open(K,c',d')
h=H(c)
h
h'
If h'=H(c)
Accept M'
Else
Reject M'
Figure 2.3: Pasini and Vaudenay’s protocol.
Mashatan and Stinson (MS’06 in Figure 2.4) [27] and Reyhanitabar et al. 
(RWN’07 in Figure 2.5) [36] proposed two protocols that are somewhat similar to 
each other. Both protocols send the message together with a randomly chosen key 
over the insecure channel and a hash of that message computed utilizing the key over 
the authenticated channel. However, while [27] utilizes a hybrid collision resistant 
hash, [36] uses an enhanced target collision resistant hash.
MS'oe
Alice Bob
M. |M|=/i 
Choose K
M,K 
-------— > M',K'
h=H{M\\K)
h
h '
If h'=H(M'\\K')
Accept M'
Else
Reject M'
Figure 2.4: Mashatan and Stinson’s protocol.
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RWN'07
Alice Bob
M M,K
Choose K -------------> M',K'
h
h=HK(M) i-----------o - h'
If h'=Hn{M')
Accept M'
Else
Reject M'
Figure 2.5: Reyhanitabar et a/.’s protocol.
In order for these protocols to be applicable to scenarios where frequent use 
of the authenticated channel is necessary, the manual authenticated channel in these 
protocols needs to be replaced by a non-manual channel. However, even with this 
modification, remotely located verifiers become prone to a channel spoof attack, as 
explained below, defeating the protocols’ purpose.
Adaptation of existing non-interactive dual channel protocols for 
frequent authentication. Since it is impractical for a human assisted channel 
to engage continuously in the authentication process, the manual channel in the 
existing non-interactive dual channel protocols needs to be replaced with a non- 
manual channel to facilitate continuous authentication by a remote verifier. Figure 2.6 
presents a generic representation of such an adaptation. Bob in this figure represents 
a remote verifier that authenticates Alice. Alice produces two sets of information, 
r\ and r2, and transmits them respectively over the insecure and authenticated non- 
manual channels. Bob perceives receiving r'x from sourcex and r'2 from source2. Upon 
receiving r\ and r'2, Bob determines if they are consistent, i.e., if r'2 authenticates r[.
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Alice Bob
Source:: Send r,
r,
— ► Receive r',
Source2: Send r>
ri
=C> Receive r '2
If (r't,r'i) is consistent 
Accept r'i
Else
Reject r'i
Endif
Figure 2.6: A possible adaptation of existing non-interactive dual channel protocols 
for frequent authentication.
This adaptation, however, opens up the possibility of a channel spoof attack; 
an adversary, Eve, residing at sourcei, can compute her own r\ and r2, transmit ri 
from sourcei, and spoof the identity of source2 to make it appear to Bob that r2 is 
transmitted from source2, thus defeating the scheme. To avoid this attack, Bob must 
have a way to know if an r2 is really generated by Alice, which a simple replacement 
of the manual channel with a non-manual one cannot ensure.
2.2 Existing Traffic A uthen tication  Schemes
One of the most prevalent security threats is the exfiltration of sensitive 
information (e.g., passwords, social security numbers, etc.) by malicious programs or 
entities. A recently reported example of this is the Heartbleed bug [6] that exposed a 
security flaw in the OpenSSL protocol [32] allowing would be attackers to access data 
(such as usernames and passwords, content of emails, instant messages, etc.) from 
the memory of servers using this protocol.
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Though this bug was not reported to be a deliberate attack on Internet 
communication, it nonetheless shows the vulnerability of online information to ded­
icated, unscrupulous individuals. In this work, we specifically address the scenarios 
where attackers deliberately target their victims’ information, and by exploiting 
compromises on the victims’ computers (e.g., through drive-by downloads), they are 
able to steal and exfiltrate sensitive information to external malicious entities under 
the control of the attackers.
To prevent this malicious exfiltration of users’ information, a number of schemes 
have been proposed to authenticate traffic being sent out of users’ computers. We 
categorize the existing approaches as: (i) statistical testing based methods [42, 4] in 
which observed statistical properties of both malicious and benign traffic (e.g., new 
connection establishment rates, packet sizes, upload/download bandwidth) are used 
to train classifiers for future classification of unknown traffic; (ii) keystroke/mouse- 
click association based methods [19] that rely on keystroke/mouse activity to catego­
rize traffic that is sent within a defined interval of such activity as being legitimate 
(benign) and all other traffic is categorized as being malicious; (iii) packet marking 
based methods [46] that introduce check points at different levels of the network 
protocol stack to mark and verify traffic (for the markings) as the traffic goes through 
the stack. The assumption is that malicious traffic does not go through the entire 
stack, and hence it will not be marked; (iv) heuristic rule based filtering (e.g., firewalls) 
[20] that employ a rule set (e.g., based on port numbers) that is used to distinguish 
between benign and malicious traffic depending on whether the traffic meets the 
specified rules; (v) blacklist based egress filtering [10, 38] that maintain a set of
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known malicious traffic characteristics (e.g., IP addresses/domain names) and block 
traffic whose characteristics match those in the set; and (vi) content sensitivity based 
filtering [12] that checks the content of data being sent to determine its sensitivity. 
The assumption made here is that the data is structured, and hence, its sensitivity 
can be determined based on its content.
However, even with these approaches being deployed, malware is still able to 
exfiltrate information due to certain limitations that the above approaches face e.g., 
the first four are vulnerable to malware’s adaptation to the associated filtering logics, 
the fifth one suffers from incomplete coverage of malicious recipients, and the sixth 
one fails to identify and prevent unstructured sensitive data from exfiltration.
Of the above approaches, the two that are most comparable to our work are [19] 
and [46]. The difference between these two approaches and ours is that malware’s 
adaptation to our scheme is unlikely to occur since authentication decisions are made 
based on typing activity on the keyboard in which host-based malware cannot engage. 
Additionally, unlike [46] that assume limited kernel malware, our solution does not 
impose any restriction on malware in the host.
CHAPTER 3
THE PROPOSED PROTOCOL
3.1 The Protocol
This dissertation presents, in Figure 3.1, a non-inter active dual channel pro­
tocol [21] that resolves the issue of a channel spoof attack, mentioned in Chapter 2, 
by utilizing a synchronization variable, E  which, unlike [16, 27, 36], is not randomly 
chosen, but generated by a function H  instead. In a practical deployment of the 
protocol, a system administrator initializes E  to both Alice and Bob. Alice and 
Bob, thereafter, individually computes the successive values of E  using H. Since 
for a specific instance of an authentication request Bob is aware of the expected E , 
Eve can no longer launch a channel spoof attack without knowing which E  Bob is 
expecting. For ease of reference, we present the notations used in the protocol and 
their meanings in Table 3.1.
Alice in this protocol can be realized as a keystroke parsing program partici­
pating in the protocol on behalf of the user and Bob as a verifier program located in 
a remote computer. Alice parses the keystrokes to extract rv, an IP/domain name 
that has been typed and computes hi = H(rv) and h2 = H(E) using a standard hash 
function H. Alice releases rv to the host using the insecure channel and transmits 
(hi, h2) to Bob using the authenticated channel. Not all the typed IP/domain names
21
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Alice Admin
Initialize 
E, HQ, HQ
Bob
(a)
Alice 
Send rv
Bob
-► Receive r \
Send hi = H(n) ( h [ M
hi -  H(E) i..... . ■> Receive (h'uh'i)
Update E = H(E) If h'2=H(E)
Update E-H(E)
Endlf
Case 1: Both r \&  (h\,h'i) received
Block A: If (r'vji'i) is consistent
Accept r\.
S=Su{ r'v } u H y v
Block B: Else If r 'yB  S
Accept rV
S=SuIPr >v
h'„ij=h\
Block C: Else
Reject r',.
h'oifh'i
Endlf
Case 2: Only r \ received
Block D: If (r\,h'„u) is consistent
Accept r'v
S=Su{ r'v }uIPr ;
Block E: Else If r ' ve  S
Accept r',
S=SuIPr '„
Block F: Else
Reject r'v
Endlf
Case 3: Only (h 'tjt’i) rece:
Block G : Discard h'\
(b)
Figure 3.1: The proposed non-interactive dual channel protocol.
are intended to send a request (e.g., a user may type an IP/domain name while writing 
a report). If a user intends to send a request to rv, the host is supposed to forward 
that request to rv via the insecure channel.
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Table 3.1: Symbols used in the protocol and their meanings.
Symbol Meaning
rv request sent to the verifier (domain name or IP address)
E the synchronization variable used in the protocol
hi the hash value of rv
/i2 the hash value of E
H a standard hash function applied to rv to produce hi and to E  to 
produce h2
H update function used to produce a new E
IPrv a list of IP addresses returned in response to an accepted rv
S a set of all accepted rvs and IPr„ s
hold an unused and saved value of hi
x' Bob’s received value of x
->• insecure channel
authenticated channel
For this protocol, we assume that a malicious program residing in a host cannot 
remove, modify or stall information transmitted over the authenticated channel that 
bypasses the host. The protocol also assumes the following: (i) an hi can verify the 
associated rv; (ii) an adversary (Eve) can generate and replace the rv, but it is difficult 
for her to compute the associated hi from a given rv\ (iii) Bob can compute h[ from 
r ' . An r'v is accepted only if (r'v, h\) is consistent, i.e., the hash Bob computes for the 
r'v is the same as h\ . The protocol works in two phases: (i) the initialization phase 
(Figure 3.1(a)) and, (ii) the protocol phase (Figure 3.1(b)) as described below.
(i) In itia liza tion  phase
The initialization phase is a one step setup process required prior to the establishment 
of the rest of the protocol. During this phase, a human operator assigns the hash 
function H , and a pair of secret E  and update function H  to Alice and Bob. H  is 
used to compute hi from rv and function H  is used to update and synchronize E  by 
both Alice and Bob. Use of H  prevents an adversary from computing subsequent Es
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in the unlikely event of randomly guessing a right E. If, for instance, due to some 
failures E  is no longer synchronized, all authentication requests are rejected and E  
needs to be re-initialized.
(ii) Protocol phase
In the protocol phase, Alice transmits rv via the insecure channel and (h\, h2) via 
the authenticated channel to Bob. Alice updates her E, using the function H , after 
sending (h i,h2) to Bob. If h'2 =  H(E), Bob assumes that h'2 is computed by Alice 
and updates his E  to have the same value as that of Alice. Bob maintains a set S  of 
accepted IPs and domain names. The set of IPs returned by Domain Name Servers 
(DNS) for an accepted domain name r'v, denoted as 7Pr/, are also included in S  (we 
assume that the DNS are not compromised). Updating S  for an r'v or a set IPr'v 
refers to the inclusion of r'v or elements in I Prj to S, if they do not already belong to 
S. While checking if a given domain name matches with a domain name in S', Bob 
compares up to the third-level for country code domains, and up to the second-level 
for other domains.
3.1.1 Protocol Scenarios and Operation
In the three cases presented below, we discuss, in detail, the scenarios that 
are likely to arise during the operation of the protocol and their respective resolution. 
Figures 3.2 and 3.3, respectively, provide a summary of these scenarios and their 
resolution. The correspondence between a case resolution branch in Figure 3.3 and a 
leaf scenario in Figure 3.2 is represented by the type of their border lines.
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Only rv 
sent
Only rv 
sent
'Only (/ti,/t2)’ 
• sent i
,'Only (M,h2)' 
' sent i
In sync
Typed
Program
Program
Intent
User
No intent
Malicious
No action
Scenarios
Non-typed Legitimate
Compute
(hl.h2)
(hl,/)2 ) not 
computed
"Both ry ancf 
(hi ,t72) sent
Both rv and'' 
.(hi ,h2) sent
Out of sync Removed
Both rv and^fBoth rv and1 
L(/i1,/i2) sentj[(hi,fi2 ) sent,
Figure 3.2: Protocol scenario tree showing the different types of outgoing requests 
that are likely to be encountered during a protocol run and information sent to the 
verifier in each case.
Case
resolution
(r'v.h'i) not 
consistent
(r’v-h'l)
consistent
(r v-h'old)
consistent
(r'v.h'o/d) not 
consistent
Figure 3.3: Protocol operation tree showing how the verifier implements the protocol 
to accept or reject an outbound request based on the information received during a 
given protocol run.
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Case 1: r'v is received through the insecure channel and (h[, h'2) is 
received through the authenticated channel. All the possible scenarios for 
which this may occur include: (i) a user sends an authentication request by typing 
on the keyboard leading Alice to transmit (hi,/i2 ), and the host to forward an 
authentication request to the associated r„; (ii) a user types a domain name or IP 
without intending to send a request leading Alice to transmit (hi,/i2 ), but the host 
does not forward any authentication request; however, a legitimate program or a 
malicious program residing in the host sends an authentication request at the same 
time to an r„; (iii) a user sends an authentication request but an rv from a legitimate 
or a malicious program reaches Bob before the rv from the user, causing Bob to receive 
a wrong r ',  (h\ , h'2) pair; (iv) a malicious program computes (hi ,h2) for her own rv 
utilizing a random E  and transmits them both through the insecure channel, but she 
makes it appear that is transmitted through the authenticated channel by
spoofing the source IP; and (v) a malicious program replaces the rv belonging to a 
user or a legitimate program’s request with another rv.
For scenario (i), the condition in Block A (see protocol diagram, Figure 3.1) 
is satisfied, the r'v is accepted and Bob updates S  for r'v and IPr>v, the associated IPs 
returned by a DNS when r'v is a domain name.
For scenarios (ii) and (iii), either the condition in Block B is satisfied, or r'v 
is rejected in Block C; depending on whether the r ' is already included in S. Bob 
saves the h\ as h'old anticipating the arrival of an associated r'v due to scenario (iii). 
If the condition in Block B is satisfied, Bob accepts r'v and updates S  for IPT>;. It 
may, however, happen that the r'v that Bob receives from a legitimate or malicious
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program incidentally matches with the rv sent for a user’s request. In that case, the 
condition in Block A is satisfied, Bob accepts r'v and updates S.
For scenarios (iv) and (v), either Block C or the condition in Block B applies 
depending on whether r ' e  S  or not. Block C rejects r'v. However, if Eve chooses to 
use an rv £ S, the r'v is accepted, and S  as well as h'old is updated in Block B. We note 
that the update of S  and h'old does not affect the protocol’s operation as explained 
below.
Acceptance of an r'v received from a malicious program because it matches the 
rv a user sent a request to, or because r'v € S  does not constitute exfiltration to Eve’s 
choice of destinations because of the assumption that, for the purpose of exfiltration, 
the adversary’s choice of destinations do not include any legitimate destinations.
Case 2: Only r'v is received through the insecure channel. This is 
possible in the following scenarios: (i) a user sends an authentication request, but an 
rv from a legitimate or a malicious program reaches Bob before the rv from the user. 
This causes Bob to pair the user’s (hi, h2) with the legitimate or malicious program’s 
r„ and subsequently receiving the user’s rv without the corresponding (hi, h2)\ (ii) 
a user sends a non-typed request to a destination; (iii) a legitimate or a malicious 
program sends an authentication request; (iv) a malicious program replaces the rv 
belonging to a user’s non-typed request or a legitimate program’s request with another 
rv.
For scenario (i), if corresponding h\ is preserved as h'old, the condition in Block 
D is satisfied, the r ' is accepted and Bob updates S  for r'v and IPr>v. Otherwise (i.e., 
if Bob earlier received the same r ' from another source satisfying the condition in
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Block A and thus not preserving h[, however, updating S  for r'v), the condition in
Block E is satisfied, r ' is accepted and S  is updated.
For scenarios (ii), (iii) and (iv), either the condition in Block E is satisfied, 
or r ' is rejected in Block F, depending on whether the r’v is already included in S. 
If the condition in Block E is satisfied, Bob accepts r ' and updates S  for IPr>v. As 
explained in Case 1, the acceptance of an r'v received from a malicious program due 
to r'v £ S, does not constitute exfiltration.
Case 3: Only (h^h^) is received through the authenticated channel. 
This case is possible when Bob receives only (h'^h^) due to the following scenarios:
(i) a user types a domain name or IP without intending to send a request, leading 
Alice to transmit (hi, h2), but the host does not forward any authentication request;
(ii) a malicious program residing in the host removes the rv for a typed request sent 
by the user; (iii) a malicious program residing in the host randomly generates (h\, h2) 
and transmits them to Bob (making it appear that they are transmitted from Alice), 
hoping that h2 — H(E),  which would break the synchronization of E  between Alice 
and Bob. In all of these scenarios, Bob receives no r ' from any sources; Block G
applies to all of them and Bob discards the h[.
Frequent disruptions of communications due to the replacement or removal of 
rv by a malicious program (Case 1, scenario (v); Case 2, scenario (iv); Case 3, scenario
(ii)) will expose the presence of that malware, which defeats the malware’s objective 
of operating stealthily, and thus malware is unlikely to engage in such activity under 
this protocol.
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3.1.2 Security Analysis of the Protocol
Given the presented protocol, a malicious destination can only be authenticat­
ed if the malware on the host is able to make Bob think that the request sent to that 
destination was actually sanctioned by the user. We consider that a malicious agent 
Eve, residing in the host, can transmit her choice of an reve through the insecure 
channel and make Bob accept it in the following cases:
Case 1: Spoof attack. As mentioned, our protocol resolves the issue of 
channel spoof attacks by using the variable E  that is maintained separately by Alice 
and Bob and simultaneously updated by them. Both the Es are initialized with the 
same value before the protocol is deployed and their subsequent values, at a given 
instance, are computed independently by Alice and Bob using H. Since Bob is aware 
of the expected value of E  that Alice is using to compute h2 for a specific instance of 
an authentication request, an adversary (Eve), must be able to compute the correct 
H(E)  to make Bob believe that she is transmitting (hi, h2) through the authenticated 
channel, and not just spoofing the identity of Alice.
An attempt at such an attack, therefore, would require Eve to compute h2 
using a randomly chosen E' so that H(E)  = H(E')  where E  and E' may or may not 
be the same i.e., E'  is a preimage or a second preimage of E. To prevent this attack, 
the hash function, HQ,  is required to be resistant to preimage and second preimage 
attacks. Since the value of H(E)  is not known to Eve, she would launch a one-shot 
attack and hope for success. The probability of Eve launching a successful spoof 
attack is es + ep, where es and ep are the probabilities of successful second preimage 
and preimage one-shot attacks on HQ,  respectively.
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Case 2: Message replacement attack. In this attack, Eve does not 
compute her own Instead, she replaces Alice’s rv with her own reve and
is successful if reve is a second preimage, i.e., H(rv) =  H(reve). A second preimage 
resistant hash function, HQ is necessary to prevent such an attack. If Eve has a 
set of destinations, deve from which she attempts to find the reve, the probability of 
launching a message replacement attack using an element in deve is 1 — [1 — es]L where 
€s is the probability of a successful second preimage one-shot attack on HQ and L 
=  |deve|- If Eve does not check for H(rv) = H(reve), but simply replaces rv with a 
randomly chosen reve, then the probability of Eve successfully launching a message 
replacement attack is es.
3.2 Protocol Extensions
3.2.1 Protocol Extension 1: Embedded Links
A response to a legitimate request may contain links not listed in S. Although 
those are returned by a trusted destination, it is not unlikely that some of them may 
be injected by an adversary and are malicious in nature. Because of this uncertainty, 
we propose that requests to those linked destinations be accepted for a temporary 
period as well as the amount of data allowed to be transmitted to those destinations 
be restricted. An administrator can define these parameters to meet an organization’s 
security needs. Decision on embedded links mostly affects Web-browsing experience. 
We notice that the majority of these links require only simple connection requests. 
By restricting the amount of data allowed to be transmitted by the amount that an
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average connection request requires, we can minimize the “enforced user response” 
and prevent any significant exfiltration.
Considering this scenario, information can be exfiltrated if the embedded links 
are malicious. However, given that their acceptance is temporary, exfiltration can 
only occur during their temporary acceptance period. We can quantify the maximum 
amount of information exfiltration that is expected during this time as nhmtds where 
nh is the number of requests that are typed by the user, rntd is the number of embedded 
links that are accepted either during time, t or until a certain number, d of successive 
embedded links is reached, and s is the packet size (in bytes) of each request. These 
parameters can be adjusted by the system administrator to achieve the desired trade­
off between user-experience and acceptable amount of information exfiltration.
3.2.2 Protocol Extension 2: Final Destination Not Explicit
The protocol presented in Figure 3.1 can be implemented locally on a single 
host computer or in a subnet consisting of many computers. However, when the 
final destination of the outgoing request is not explicitly stated in the request, other 
entities such as mail servers (for the case of email) need to be integrated into the 
process of authenticating these requests. The second extension to the protocol, though 
not locally implement able, is proposed to address such a scenario where malware 
exfiltrates information to its cooperating entity through legitimate third party services 
as discussed below.
Adversaries may attempt to exfiltrate information by using legitimate third 
party services (e.g., webmails). To prevent this, we propose a Bloom filter based
32
extension that requires participation of the associated third party servers. The 
proposed extension requires that if Alice notices a recipient ID v (e.g., xyz@gmail.com) 
for a legitimate server rv (e.g., gmail.com), she sends (/q, /t2, v, rv) to Bob. Bob then 
creates a Bloom filter Brv, maintaining the records for all associated v's he receives 
for rv. A Bloom filter is composed of an ra-bit array and a set of w different hash 
functions [3]. The array entries are initialized to zero. Upon receiving a n , all w 
hashes of v are computed and the array locations corresponding to the computed 
hashes are set to 1. If a traffic request is sent to rv, Bob constructs a new request 
to rv, concatenating the original request and Brv. The associated third party server, 
upon receiving this concatenated request, verifies if the intended recipients of the 
associated request have corresponding entries in BTv before it delivers the message 
to those recipients. A recipient has an entry in BTv if the associated array has a “1” 
in all the positions associated with the w hashes of its ID. A “0” in any of those 
positions indicates its absence in the filter, although all “1” entries do not guarantee 
its presence. If we assume that a hash function selects each array position with equal 
probability and the probabilities of each bit being set are independent, the asymptotic 
formula, (1 — e- “,(ri+0-5)/(Tn- 1))w [13], describes the expected false positive rate for a 
finite bloom filter with n elements. The advantage of using a Bloom filter is that its 
size does not grow with the number of entries of the recipients.
CHAPTER 4
A PROTOTYPE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE 
PROTOCOL
Having developed the protocol, we went ahead to test the suitability of this 
protocol for a real world network traffic scenario. This chapter details how a prototype 
of this protocol was developed and deployed. Specifically, the threat model that was 
considered while deploying the protocol is given, then the trusted external hardware 
device that was used in the protocol as well as its comparison with internal hardware 
devices on the market today is presented, and finally the experimental setup that was 
used and results that were obtained are described.
4.1 Threat Model
The threat model considered in this dissertation assumes that the computers 
under surveillance connect to the Internet via a secure proxy that hosts traffic filters, 
which is a common scenario in many organizations. As shown in Figure 4.1, the threat 
model considers that malware infecting a host is capable of exfiltrating information 
from that host to an external malicious entity, defeating the known traffic filtering 
mechanisms. It further considers that exfiltrated information can be transmitted to 
the external malicious entity in one of two ways: (i) using the malicious entity’s 
domain name or IP address as the destination, (ii) transferring information to a
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legitimate third party service provider, such as a webmail server, that the malicious 
entity has access to. In addition, the threat model assumes that malware residing in 
a host cannot remove, modify or stall the content on a traffic channel that does not 
run through the host.
i—
Malicious
entity
Filtering 
m echanism s 
in proxy
Compromised
Host
Legitimate 
third party 
server
—  Exfiltration via third party
*■ Direct exfiltration
Figure 4.1: A diagram of our threat model showing that host based malware can 
exfiltrate information to a malicious entity either directly or through a legitimate 
third party server, bypassing existing filtering mechanisms.
4.2 Trusted Hardware
4.2.1 Trusted Platform Modules
The use of Trusted Platform Modules (TPMs) in security solutions has gained 
traction in recent years because of their ability to satisfy security properties that are 
difficult to realize through software-only solutions. In addition, their low price and 
miniature size made them suitable as add-on devices. A TPM is a microcontroller 
chip that is attached internally to a computer motherboard for the purpose of securely 
generating and storing cryptographic keys and storing encrypted data either locally 
or in the hard drive [18]. A schematic representation of the components of a TPM is 
shown in Figure 4.2.
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Figure 4.2: A diagrammatic illustration of the TPM’s components.
TPMs can ensure a trusted boot procedure by facilitating each component 
in the boot sequence to attest to the integrity of the next component and thus 
establish trust on the OS kernel. Such trust can be extended beyond the kernel 
to applications by attesting the target applications while loading, and using a similar 
chain of attestations [45]. However, if an application is pre-infected, it would still be 
attested by this process and be considered as trusted. Additionally, for an application 
to be trusted, it cannot be loaded whenever it is required; rather, it has to be loaded 
during the boot process.
A TPM comes with a set of built-in cryptographic key and hash generation 
functionalities that are operated using a predefined set of commands (or instructions), 
hard-coded into its execution engine. This prevents adversaries from exploiting the 
TPM to perform unknown operations since the TPM is accessible from the host, which 
could be compromised. However, this also limits the TPM’s programming flexibility 
since no new instructions can be added to this set of instructions after manufacturing.
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4.2.2 Raspberry Pi
To address the above limitations and to satisfy lightweight operational needs 
required by continuous authentication applications, we build our solution around 
a conceptual external trusted hardware module that we realize using a Raspberry 
Pi (shown in Figure 4.3) as a prototype. The proposed hardware module requires 
fewer security assumptions than a TPM due to its isolation from the host. It is also 
programmable, allowing implementation of given logic.
Figure 4.3: A Raspberry Pi
The Raspberry Pi Model B is a miniaturized computing device with a RISC 
processor based on a 32-bit ARM architecture. It has two USB interfaces and one 
10/100 wired Ethernet port that can facilitate networking functionality. It uses a 
removable Secure Digital (SD) card as the default secondary storage device to store 
the OS (such as Debian “Wheezy” Linux) and other necessary files. In a conceptual
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design of a hardware module to be used in this protocol, the storage would be 
integrated into the module so that it is not readily physically accessible. Write 
access to this storage would be facilitated via a USB port and restricted through 
administrative control. The Raspberry Pi is powered through a 5V micro USB.
A typical solution to support the proposed continuous traffic authentication 
protocol using a TPM would require: (i) attestation of the source of the keystrokes 
to make sure that the keystrokes are generated by the keyboard driver and not by an 
unauthorized application [45, 46], (ii) interactive protocol operation to set up a shared 
key between the client and the remote server e.g., through RSA key exchange protocol 
[46], and (iii) signing of keystroke events [46]. Steps (i) and (iii) in the above process 
would be required for each authentication request making it highly impractical for 
frequent traffic authentication. The proposed external hardware module eliminates 
the requirement of steps (i) and (ii) since it is connected externally beyond the reach 
of the malware residing in the host and requires the use of cryptographic hashes to 
realize the desired security properties.
Additionally, some of the Raspberry Pi’s functionalities such as audio, RCA, 
HDMI and GPIO ports are not required by the proposed design; hence, this should 
translate to a lower cost realization of the conceptual external trusted hardware device 
than realizing it using a Raspberry Pi.
4.3 Setup
As shown in Figure 4.4, we designed a prototype implementation of our pro­
tocol, realizing the dual channels through the keyboard’s attachment to a Raspberry
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Pi (Alice). The insecure channel ran through the host to a verifier (Bob) while 
the authenticated channel was directly connected to the verifier, bypassing the host. 
Regular communication between the host computer and the Internet was channeled 
through a proxy in which the verifier was located.
Verifier in 
Proxy
InternetHost
Insecure
channel
Authenticated
channel
Figure 4.4: A prototype of the proposed protocol showing how a single computer’s 
keyboard (aided by a Raspberry Pi) is connected to both the host computer and the 
remote verifier through the insecure and authenticated channels, respectively.
In a regular setup, once a user sends an outgoing request by typing or copying 
and pasting a domain name or IP address (rv) into a Web browser, a Web request 
is generated and sent from the host via the proxy to the request’s Web server. A 
response from the Web server, containing the requested information is sent to the 
proxy, which then forwards the same to the requesting host. Additional processing or 
filtering of outgoing and/or incoming requests can be done at the proxy if desired. Our 
scheme modified this setup by capturing the rv, using the keystroke parsing program, 
before it was sent through the host. A hashed copy of the rv was then sent directly 
to the verifier through the authenticated channel. The verifier in the proxy inspected 
all outgoing requests it received from the host before forwarding them to the Internet 
to ensure that a corresponding rv had also been sent to it from the keystroke parsing
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program. A detailed description of the protocol operation including the procedure
for handling requests that were not typed is given in Chapter 3.
Based on the prototype, we set up a small subnet consisting of a Windows 
XP and three Windows 7 machines in a graduate student laboratory that seats ten 
students. The choice of operating systems for the four machines used was arbitrary 
and has no effect on the experiments or results obtained. The Windows XP machine 
served as a dedicated proxy (verification server) hosting the remote verifier. The three 
Windows 7 machines were assigned to three of the students in the lab for daily usage. 
However, other students in the lab also routinely used these computers during the 
experimentation period.
Since all HTTP/HTTPS and DNS traffic was channeled to the external world 
(i.e., Internet) through the proxy, we implemented our protocol logic for traffic au­
thentication as follows. We developed a verification program that was deployed in 
the user space of the proxy (see Figure 4.5).
Outgoing/Incoming 
HTTP/DNS requests
KERNEL SPACE 
(Windows) Network Adapter
NDIS Interm ediate 
Driver
WinpkFilter
Verification
program
USER SPACE
Figure 4.5: A windows-based implementation of the verification server.
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We used the WinpkFilter library to set up an interface between the user space 
verification program and the NDIS Intermediate Driver such that all outgoing traffic 
received from the three Windows 7 client machines was sent to the verification pro­
gram before being forwarded to the respective destination(s) if found to be authorized.
In the proxy, we also saved the outgoing packets’ session information (i.e., 
destination IP and port) for later comparison with incoming packets. Outgoing 
packets for which no was received (via the authenticated channel) were
checked to see if the destinations belonged to the set S  before their destinations 
could be authorized. If this were true, the associated destinations were authorized. 
Otherwise, they were marked as being unauthorized and rejected.
The respective destination servers, when contacted, responded with the ap­
propriate reply messages. At the proxy, the incoming packets’ session information 
was compared with previously stored session information from the outgoing packets 
before the legitimate responses were sent back to the appropriate requesting client 
machines. Any response packets that were received without a legitimate request (i.e., 
no session information recorded) were rejected.
As shown in Figure 4.6, a similar setup can also be achieved in a Linux 
environment by setting rules through IP tables for the built-in firewall, NetFilter, 
instructing it to send all packets (both incoming and outgoing) to the user space. 
Using the Libipq library, the user space verification program would receive packets 
from the kernel space and inspect them for their authenticity before sending the 
packets with verified recipient information back to the NetFilter for release to the 
network.
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Figure 4.6: A possible linux-based implementation of the verification server.
The keystroke parsing program (on the Raspberry Pi) was used to scan keystrokes 
as a user typed, identify domain names and IP addresses, compute hashes (h i,h2) 
and release the hashes through the authenticated channel; the normal flow of the 
keystrokes was released to the insecure channel. A subnet router, upon receiving 
any traffic through either of the channels, forwarded this traffic to the proxy. The 
verifier on the proxy continuously monitored the outgoing traffic and extracted the 
destination domain names and IPs (rv). It then followed the protocol described in 
Chapter 3 while granting authentication.
We maintained a shared IP/domain name set S  in the verification server for the 
traffic requests from all three host computers so that prior validations of a request from 
one host was effective for the other hosts, too. When cheeking if a given domain name 
matched with a domain name in S, we compared up to the third-level for country code 
domains, and up to the second-level for other domains. We also implemented protocol 
extension 1 to allow the embedded links only to establish connections. However, we 
skipped protocol extension 2 since it required participation of the third party external
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servers. Over a 90-day period, all the outgoing traffic requests from the Windows 7 
machines were stored in the verifier and the collected data during this time was 
analyzed to investigate the performance of the proposed protocol.
4.4 Experimental Results
To analyze the collected data and measure the protocol’s performance, we 
undertook two studies. In the first study, we measured the general performance 
statistics when using the protocol such as how many requests were sent, composition 
of these requests, acceptance (or denial) rates of the requests, among others. In the 
second study, we measured protocol performance from the users’ perspective, i.e., how 
convenient (or inconvenient) it was for the users to utilize this protocol. We present 
these two studies and the associated results below.
4.4.1 Accuracy
In this study, our objective was to recognize the outgoing network requests 
that were sanctioned by the users (through users’ activity such as typing, clicking, 
copying and pasting, etc.) or by non-malicious programs on the users’ computers 
(e.g., legitimate software’s auto update programs) as legitimate requests (i.e., accept 
them) and deny all other unsanctioned (illegitimate) requests.
We computed true accept rates as the ratio of the accepted requests to the total 
number of requests that had been typed at least once and hence had an associated 
entry in the set S  of accepted rvs and lP Tvs. We then computed false accept rates by 
either checking whether any of the embedded links had appeared in databases (e.g., 
DNSBL [10], SBL [38]) of known malicious sites or by manually inspecting if their
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IPs resolved to unverifiable or suspicious entities through Whois Lookup. Based on 
our protocol, false accepts are only likely to occur if S  is compromised or some of the 
embedded links are malicious. Since our threat model assumes that the verification 
server is secure, we assume S  to be secure too, and hence, our test for false accepts 
only consisted of examining the latter.
We computed true reject rates from those requests which were denied and 
either had no associated entry in S  (implying that they were never typed by a user 
during our experimentation period), or whose IPs resolved to unverifiable or suspicious 
entities through manual inspection.
We computed false reject rates from, (i) requests that were initially denied 
(because their destinations had not been previously typed) and were later accepted 
after having been typed by the user, meaning that they later had an associated entry 
in S, and (ii) requests that were denied whose IPs resolved to legitimate entities 
through manual inspection. Requests in (ii) included programmatic requests from 
legitimate software and rejected requests that users did not re-attempt to send by 
typing their respective destinations.
We observed that all illegitimate requests sent during the experimentation 
period were correctly identified and denied in accordance with the protocol. For the 
legitimate requests, though their acceptance rate varied daily, it was generally seen 
to improve with continual usage of the protocol. To better visualize this behavior, we 
divided the dataset into three subsets in order to show the performance improvement 
in each subset. The subsets were created as follows: The first subset contained data 
collected in the first 30 days, the second subset contained data collected in the next
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30 days (i.e., from the 31st day to the 60th day), and the third subset contained 
data collected from the last 30 days (i.e., from the 61st day to the 90th day). In 
each subset (time interval), we divided the legitimate requests into the typed and 
non-typed categories in order to observe the daily acceptance rates of each category 
(see Table 4.1 for a brief description of the dataset).
Table 4.1: Characteristics of the dataset used.
Period of traffic 
collection
No. of unique 
typed requests
No. of unique
non-typed
requests
1st 30-day period Nov’12 1488 18269
2nd 30-day period Mid-Dec’12 - Mid- 
Jan’13
1529 16372
3rd 30-day period Feb’13 1475 16736
The results from this study are presented in Figure 4.7. These results show 
that, on each day, every typed request was accepted. Some of the non-typed requests, 
however, were not accepted since these requests had not been typed previously (hence 
violated the protocol’s authentication requirement). Nonetheless, we observed that 
on average, the daily true accept rate for the non-typed category was approximately 
98.8%, 98.9%, and 99.5% in the three time intervals, respectively. Since this category 
dominated the typed category (as seen in plots (a), (b) and (c) of Figure 4.8), their 
acceptance rate greatly influenced the overall acceptance rate of the combined requests 
(both typed and non-typed) whose daily true accept rate was seen to be approximately 
98.8%, 99%, and 99.5% on average, in the three respective time intervals (see Table
4.2 for a summary of the average true accept rates in each period).
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Figure 4.7: Plots (a), (b) and (c) show, in 30-day intervals, the daily percentage 
acceptance rates of legitimate requests (both the typed and non-typed requests) 
during the period under study.
46
typed requests I I non-typed requests
100
w«
3
cr
£aj
re
£
o>
®_i
g
100
<0
(A 80a>
9
O’
£ 60
3cs
E 40
3
'5a_i 20
r?ioo
a3ty
£  60
a«
£  40
a>
4)
20
Day
(a)
I typed requests I I non-typed requests]
35 40 45 SO 55 60
Day
(6)
I typed requests I Inon-tvped requests
(c)
Figure 4.8: The bar graphs in plots (a), (b) and (c) show, in 30-day intervals, 
the percentage-wise contributions of typed and non-typed requests to the overall 
legitimate requests seen daily during the period under study.
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Table 4.2: Percentage results during the 90-day period for, (i) daily averages of true 
accept rates for the non-typed as well as combined requests, and (ii) maximum false 
reject rates for all legitimate requests (i.e., both user and program requests) as well 
as only the users’ legitimate requests.
Average True Accepts (%) Maximum False Rejects (%)
Non-typed
requests
Combined
requests
All
legitim ate
requests
Only users’
legitim ate
requests
1st 30-day period 98.8 98.8 6 1.2
2nd 30-day period 98.9 99 5 0.92
3rd 30-day period 99.5 99.5 2 0.75
As seen from these results, the performance of the protocol improved in each 
successive time interval, implying that continual usage of the protocol led to an im­
provement in its accuracy measurements. This improvement is attributed to continual 
growth of the set, S, allowing non-typed requests (that had been typed previously by 
at least one of the users) to be accepted. During the entire experimentation period, 
we did not notice any false accepts.
4.4.2 Enforced User Response
In this study, our objective was to examine the impact of the requirement for 
destination requests to be typed at least once before they could be accepted. Since 
this requirement is central to the working of our protocol, the number of times a user 
makes a non-typed request, which is rejected, and the user has to re-send the request 
after typing its destination, is an important aspect to consider. To investigate this, 
we asked the users to maintain their natural browsing habits when using the machines. 
We also advised them to type a destination IP address or domain name if their non- 
typed requests were rejected. (It is likely that some cases of rejected requests arise due
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to the associated server being down or offline; however, our dataset did not include 
such cases.)
We present the observations from this study using Cumulative Distribution 
Function (CDF) plots that show the maximum observed quantities for, (a) accepted 
requests that were naturally typed, (b) legitimate non-typed user and program re­
quests that were denied, and (c) legitimate non-typed user requests that were denied. 
The results in this study are also shown in 30-day intervals (representing the same 
three subsets described above) of the entire 90-day period.
Interestingly, we observed that, in a number of instances, the users naturally 
typed the destinations without being asked. Plots (a), (b) and (c) of Figure 4.9 
show that in the three time intervals considered, accepted requests that had been 
voluntarily typed by users were 30%, 35% and 35%, respectively.
The CDFs of false reject rates for non-typed user and program requests, during 
the three 30-day intervals representing the entire 90-day period, are shown together 
in plots (a), (b) and (c) of Figure 4.10. They show that the maximum false reject 
rates for all non-typed legitimate requests on a given day were less than 6%, 5% and 
2%, in each of the three 30-day periods, respectively. We observed that as the set “S'” 
became populated over time, the number of false rejects dropped, leading to daily 
average false reject rates of approximately 1.2%, 1% and 0.5% in each of the three 
30-day periods, respectively. We point out that these false reject rates, however, do 
not relate to the ability of the protocol to prevent information exfiltration but rather 
simply reflect the usability of the protocol.
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Figure 4.9: CDF plots showing, in 30-day intervals, the accepted requests that were
typed during the period under study.
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Figure 4.10: CDF plots showing, in 30-day intervals, the legitimate non-typed user
and program requests that were denied during the period under study.
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Of the requests that were non-typed, some of these were rejected (because 
they had not been previously typed) and users were compelled to type these requests 
in order for them to be accepted. We refer to these requests as the non-typed user 
requests. Plots (a), (b) and (c) of Figure 4.11 show the CDFs of the rejected non- 
typed user requests. They show that the maximum false reject rate on a given day 
for non-typed user requests, during the three 30-day intervals representing the entire 
90-day period, were less than 1.2%, 0.92% and 0.75%, respectively (see Table 4.2). 
When the users typed those requests, all of them were accepted.
These percentages give a measure of the level of inconvenience that the users 
experienced due to the requirement set by the proposed scheme. However, we found 
that in comparison to the maximum percentages of requests that were naturally typed 
by the users (which was 30%, 35% and 35% of all accepted requests), the forced typing 
(which was 1.2%, 0.92% and 0.75% of only non-typed user requests) was not very 
significant. In addition, the forced typing requirement is akin to somewhat common 
scenarios that a user experiences when he/she deletes his/her browsing history, or uses 
a new Web browser and has to type the domain name/IP addresses before he/she can 
be assisted by the autocomplete feature of the browsers, and thus is not a significant 
deterrent from using the protocol.
In Appendix A, we provide the daily trends of these results, i.e., accepted 
requests that were typed, legitimate non-typed user and program requests that were 
denied as well as the legitimate non-typed user requests that were denied.
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Figure 4.11: CDF plots showing, in 30-day intervals, the legitimate non-typed user
requests that were denied during the period under study.
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4.4.3 Replicating these Results
Motivated by the results obtained over the entire 90-day period, we sought to 
investigate whether this performance was tied to the specific time frame of protocol 
usage or whether it could be replicated, say if protocol usage began on a different day. 
To achieve this, we repeated our experiments using different start dates of protocol 
deployment in order to observe the change in performance, if any. From the three 
subsets created above, we took each subset to represent a unique and independent 
30-day period of protocol usage, i.e., for each time period, we considered the protocol 
to have been in use only during that specific 30-day period. At the start of each 
period, therefore, the set S  was cleared (or emptied) such that there was no history 
of previously typed requests. This investigation revealed that the behavior of the 
protocol was fairly consistent irrespective of the initial date of deploying the protocol. 
For instance, when considering the daily acceptance rates of legitimate requests (see 
Figure 4.12), we found that the daily average of true accept rates for legitimate typed 
and non-typed requests during each of these 30-day periods was consistently above 
96% with no false accepts being observed.
Figures 4.13 and 4.14 provide a summary of the results obtained from this 
study. They show the averages of the daily percentages of legitimate requests that 
were accepted, accepted requests that were typed and non-typed, legitimate user and 
program requests that were denied, and legitimate user requests that were denied. 
To obtain these results, for each quantity being measured, we averaged the daily 
percentage results from the three individual periods, e.g., the percentage value on
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Figure 4.12: Plots (a), (b) and (c) show the daily percentage acceptance rates of 
legitimate requests (both the typed and non-typed requests) during the new first, 
second and third 30-day periods under study.
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Day 1 represents the average of the three percentage values obtained on Day 1 from 
each of the three 30-day periods.
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Figure 4.13: Percentages of, (a) legitimate requests that were accepted, (b) accepted
requests that were non-typed, (c) accepted requests that were typed, averaged from
the daily rates observed during the three 30-day periods under study.
Figure 4.14: Percentages of, (a) legitimate user and program requests that were 
not accepted, (b) legitimate user requests that were not accepted, averaged from the 
daily rates observed during the three 30-day periods under study.
CHAPTER 5
DISCUSSIONS
5.1 Alternative Placement of the Authenticated Channel
In this dissertation, the presented protocol has utilized an authenticated chan­
nel that is placed outside (i.e., bypasses) the host and therefore is presumed to be 
inaccessible by the malware inside a possibly compromised host computer. This serves 
not only to guarantee that the information transmitted through this channel is not 
tampered with, but also that it cannot be blocked (or removed) by the malware.
Before settling for this design, we considered the alternative of running the 
authenticated channel through the host. In such a design, the security of information 
transmitted through this channel would be guaranteed by transmitting the informa­
tion, for example, through commonly used secure sessions for data transmission such 
as the Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol [9]. In this way, the information 
sent through the authenticated channel would be encrypted using a secret key known 
only to the hardware module (Alice) and the verifier (Bob). This would guarantee 
that an adversary (Eve), located on the host, would neither be able to encrypt her 
own information nor discover the contents of Alice’s encrypted information without 
knowledge of the key.
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However, a drawback of such a design for our protocol is, there being no 
independent communication channel between the hardware module and the verifier 
(i.e., without going through the host), the adversary could potentially block all 
information being sent from the host to the verifier. Though this would not be 
beneficial to the adversary, in terms of exfiltrating information, it is likely to lead 
to a denial of service scenario for the user(s) since all Web requests will likely be 
denied. This in turn is likely to negatively impact on the user convenience aspect of 
our protocol. If such a scenario were to occur, it is likely to go on for a while without 
being detected, because the user may think that the Web server to which his/her 
request is being sent, is offline or busy.
By placing the authenticated channel outside the host, therefore, we are able to 
ensure that in such denial of service cases where the adversary blocks Web requests, 
the authenticating information for those requests can still be sent to the verifier. 
As a check mechanism, once the verifier receives several pieces of authenticating 
information, without corresponding Web requests, it could send a message to the 
system administrator informing them of a possible denial of service scenario that 
requires investigation.
5.2 Verifier Workload
In this protocol, the verifier is tasked with such a significant amount of work 
(i.e., continual updating of the set, S  of authenticated destinations, as well as scanning 
the set to check for the presence of an entry) that it needs to execute hastily so as not 
to slow down the authentication process. In a practical deployment of this protocol,
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care must be taken to ensure that the verifier is not bogged down by these operations. 
An important consideration when choosing a data structure to implement the set, 
S  therefore should be the need to minimize the time complexity of the insertion 
and searching operations. One way of achieving this is by using a hash table-like 
implementation of S  in which an m-bit array, employing a hash function, h to map 
an input, i into a position in the array (i.e., 0 <h(i) <m), acts as a pointer to the 
possible presence of an element in S. In this setup, all array indices are initially 
set to 0 and a particular index is set to 1 when the hash value of a given input is 
mapped to that index. Ideally, the hash values produced by h should be uniformly 
distributed such that there is an equal chance of an input being mapped to any of 
the array indices. This reduces the possibility of hash collisions (i.e., more than one 
input mapping to the same array index) occurring. However, given that, theoretically, 
there exists an infinite set of inputs that would have to be mapped into a finite set of 
array indices, hash collisions are still likely to occur. This could result in false positive 
results (an element being reported to be in the array when it is not) when searching 
for an element whose hash value corresponds to an index that has previously been 
set to 1.
An approach to avoid these false positives is to maintain a self-balancing binary 
search tree (e.g., a red-black tree) for each array index (see Figure 5.1 in which a red- 
black tree is shown for only index 0 of the array) such that the actual values of i are 
stored in the tree associated with the array index to which h(i) is mapped.
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Figure 5.1: Hash table-like data structure in which, for each array index, there is a 
red-black tree to store the elements whose hash value corresponds to that index.
In this way, when searching for a specific element, computing its hash value 
only serves to locate the index under whose tree to search for that element. A self- 
balancing binary search tree is ideal for such an implementation because elements in 
the tree are always stored in a sorted manner; hence, the time required to perform 
insertion and search operations for tree elements is not adversely affected by the 
growth of the tree.
In the context of our protocol, when a destination (domain name or IP address) 
is to be added to the set S, the destination’s hash value would first be computed, after 
which the array index corresponding to the destination’s hash value would be set to 
1. The specific destination itself would then be stored in the red-black tree under 
the associated array index. When searching whether a given destination is in S  or 
not, the hash value of that destination would first be computed to determine which 
index of the array the destination’s hash value maps to. If the corresponding index 
is set to 0, this would directly imply that the destination is not in set S  (since there 
is no likelihood of false negative results). On the other hand, if the index is set to 
1, this would imply that the destination is possibly present in S. The red-black tree
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associated with that index would then be traversed to determine whether the element 
is actually stored or if it was simply a case of a false positive result.
Obviously, given that the expected number of entries (destinations) to be 
stored is bound to influence the anticipated size of the array (in order to further 
minimize the chances of hash collisions), choosing an appropriate size of m  is key to 
the use of such a data structure. Though the exact number of destinations that will 
be stored cannot be known a priori, we posit that in our protocol, the astronomical 
growth of set S  is not likely to occur since S' is a global set, implying that a destination 
authenticated for one user is considered authenticated for all users in the same network 
and, therefore, is only stored once. Additionally, since studies on user browsing 
behavior have shown that users tend to revisit the same pages (e.g., see [25], [41],
[29]), we expect that this will in turn limit the number of new entries to be added 
and subsequently the growth of S  over time. The choice of m, therefore, is mainly 
dependent on the application scenario (i.e., number of users for whom S  is maintained) 
and could be determined from the observation of the number of unique destinations 
to which users send requests in a given period of time (e.g., a week or a month).
CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
6.1 Conclusion
In this dissertation, we have proposed a new non-interactive dual channel pro­
tocol that, unlike the existing protocols, is resistant to channel spoof attacks launched 
against the authenticated channel. This is especially important when applying the 
protocol to frequent or continuous authentication solutions that require replacement 
of the manual channel with a non-manual channel that is able to accommodate 
frequent transmission of authentication codes. We have shown how this protocol 
can be applied for authenticating network traffic and demonstrated its effectiveness 
in addressing information exfiltration with minimal user participation and/or inconve­
nience. Though our protocol requires that users type the destinations of their requests 
at least once before these requests can be authenticated, any subsequent requests to 
these destinations are accepted without the need for them to be typed again.
In the presented protocol, a malware can remove the traffic requests sent 
through the host, causing a temporary denial of service. This, however, does not 
affect information exfiltration as defined in this dissertation. In addition, since the 
protocol assumes that a legitimate user does not type a malicious IP or domain
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name, in cases where such typing may be required (e.g., during investigation of IPs 
by a malware analyst), the verifier should be made aware of such destinations.
To realize this protocol in practice, we developed a small scale laboratory 
prototype comprised of four computers. When this prototype was deployed for a 
90-day period of daily usage, we were able to achieve, on average, a 99.5% daily true 
accept rate for legitimate requests (i.e., requests sanctioned by the user) with 0% false 
accepts. During the same period, we also observed that the maximum percentage of 
false rejects was less than 6%, of which less than 1.2% of these were user requests 
that were denied for not having been typed.
Since our protocol requires that users type a request’s destination at least once 
before it can be accepted, we investigated the likelihood of users voluntarily typing 
destinations of their requests and discovered that this happened approximately 35% 
of the time. This was an encouraging discovery in the sense that the protocol’s 
typing requirement did not pose a significant encumbrance to the users (since typing 
was a part of the their normal browsing behavior). These results, though obtained 
from a small scale deployment of the protocol, offer encouraging insights that can be 
leveraged on for a large scale deployment of the protocol, if needed.
This dissertation has also proposed two extensions to the protocol in order to 
address unique scenarios that may arise during the implementation of the protocol. 
In the first extension, we proposed to address scenarios where information exfiltration 
occurs through links (which may be malicious) embedded in responses to legitimate 
requests. Since these links’ destinations may not have been typed previously, their 
authenticity cannot be verified and are only presumed to be safe because they are
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contained in the responses to legitimate requests. We propose the acceptance of these 
requests for a defined period of time (set by the network administrator) in order to 
achieve the desired trade-off between user convenience and prevention of information 
exfiltration.
The second extension considered exfiltration via legitimate third party services 
(e.g., webmail servers). This is a more complex scenario since the final destination 
of the request(s) can only be determined by the third party services. Our proposal 
to address these scenarios, therefore, requires the participation of these third party 
services and, as a result, is not implemented in this dissertation.
In this dissertation, we were able to realize the dual channels using a Raspberry 
Pi, which merely served as an example of an affordable option to realizing the dual 
channels. We postulate that the dual channel aspect of this dissertation can be in­
corporated into future designs of keyboards that support dual channel functionalities. 
In such designs, the functionalities of the Raspberry Pi that were utilized in this work 
(such as the Ethernet port, processing unit) could be built in the keyboard itself such 
that there is no need to attach an external hardware module to the keyboard.
6.2 Future Work
The work presented in this dissertation can be further explored in several 
ways. For instance, the typing requirement specified in this protocol is hinged on the 
assumption that a physical keyboard exists to which a secure hardware module can be 
attached to extract keystroke contents before they are passed on to the host operating 
system. While this assumption holds mainly for desktop computers and laptops, the
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proliferation of mobile devices (such as tablet computers, cell phones, etc.) that do 
not typically have physical keyboards, and yet are also connected to the Internet and 
thus are likely to be sources of information exfiltration, begs for the exploration of 
how the protocol presented in this dissertation can be applied to such devices since 
access to their keystroke contents before they are passed on to the operating system 
may not be as straightforward.
Another aspect worth investigating is how this protocol can be further adapt­
ed for continuous user authentication systems, specifically those that are based on 
behavioral biometrics (e.g., users’ keystroke patterns) since these systems, much like 
the traffic authentication ones, also face the risk of adversaries compromising the 
authentication efforts if the host is compromised (e.g., see [35], [39]). To the best 
of our knowledge, no defense mechanisms to prevent host-based compromises against 
continuous user authentication have been proposed to date. This is perhaps due to the 
belief that in a compromised host scenario, the user has already lost to the impostor
[14]; hence, continuous authentication has no merit under such a scenario. Contrary 
to this view, we postulate that with further research, the protocol presented in this 
dissertation can be a stepping stone for designing defense mechanisms that ensure 
successful continuous authentication in the face of possible host-based compromises.
APPENDIX A
ADDITIONAL RESULTS SHOWING DAILY TRENDS OF 
ACCEPTED AND DENIED REQUESTS
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Figure A .l: Bar graphs (a), (b), and (c), respectively, show the daily percentages
of accepted requests that were voluntarily typed during the first 30 days, the next 30
days, and the last 30 days of the period under study.
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Figure A .2: Bar graphs (a), (b), and (c), respectively, show the daily percentages
of legitimate non-typed user and program requests that were denied during the first
30 days, the next 30 days, and the last 30 days of the period under study.
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Figure A.3: Bar graphs (a), (b), and (c), respectively, show the daily percentages
of legitimate non-typed user requests that were denied during the first 30 days, the
next 30 days, and the last 30 days of the period under study.
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Table B .l: Characteristics of existing non-interactive message authentication protocols.
Property BSSW ’02 G M N’04 P V ’06 M S’06 R W N ’07
Assumed 
security of 
manual channel
weak strong weak weak weak
Security feature 
used
collision resistan- 
t hash
universal hash second preimage 
resistant hash 
and trapdoor 
commitment 
scheme
hybrid collision 
resistant hash
enhanced target 
collision resistan- 
t hash
Key-based hash 
function used?
no yes no yes yes
Input to hash 
function
message message commit value message and key message
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